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The Comment by Brooks attempts to correct 'false leads and trails' in our 
recent paper (Cebula and Kafoglis (1983)), henceforth, 'C&K'. Most of 
the problems in our paper that may require clarification are semantic in 
nature. However, Brooks goes beyond these fairly modest clarifications 
to misinterpret and reinterpret our model. Finally, Brooks arrives at 
conclusions that are very nearly identical to ours while using what he 
believes is a better formulation. Our specific responses are given below. 
1. Brooks asserts that the GB curve (gross benefits of collective action) 
in C&K is not clearly defined because C&K fail to specify whether it includes 
or excludes the tax costs of providing public goods. Since collective actions 
can involve rules and regulations which do not require taxation, since tax 
costs could be either added to the GC curve or deducted from the GB curve, 
and since it makes no difference to the analysis how this is done, we thought 
a detailed discussion of this would add confusion at a needless cost in space. 
We certainly are not guilty of making Wicksell turn over in his grave, and 
Brooks' lecture (his third paragraph) is gratuitous to say the least. With 
respect to this item, Brooks finally concludes that 'It is perhaps more 
satisfactory to interpret the · benefit curve as net of the costs of tax 
provision'. We think that perhaps he is correct. 
2. The substance of Brooks' Comment hinges on his assertion that GC(R) 
= P-GB(R). That is, Brooks asserts that the costs of inaction (GC) area 
function of group benefits (GB). Nowhere do we suggest such a relation! 
We were trying to capture the relationships (admittedly vague) posited by 
Fishkin (1979) and Rae (1975). As shown in our paper (p. 198) GB and GC 
are independent. GC is the increasing cost of the foregone alternatives when 
the voting rule is expanded Brooks mistakenly supposes that the costs of 
inaction are directly and mathematically related to the benefits of action. 
This is like supposing that a supply curve should be defined as the inverse 
of the demand curve (which is acceptable in certain specific analytical 
situations, but not in this one). The discussion throughout the remainder of 
the Comment is based on the relation GC(R) = P .GB(R). This is Brooks' 
formulation, not ours. We have no idea how he could have gleaned it from 
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our note, but believe it probably relates to our use of the term 'gross' 
in describing these curves or to our assertion that the 'probability' of 
inaction increases as the voting rule becomes more inclusive. Once 
again, the notation on p. 198 also makes it clear: GC and GB are not 
functions of one another, but that each is expressly and solely a function 
of the voting rule (R). 
3. Brooks is also critical about our use of the origin as a starting point 
for both curves. This, of course, is a geometric simplification. Our notation 
on p. 198 is clear enough in stating that our concern is with the voting range 
in excess of 50% and that it is the slopes of the curves that matter beyond 
that point.  In principle, the vertical intercept is not critical. 
When all is said and done, some semantics and some geometry may have 
been clarified by Brooks. However, Brooks' major contention that our 
model implies GC = P .GB is in error. Moreover, we do not believe that a 
model based on standard probability theory is capable of capturing these 
relationships. What is more important, is that we all come out at about the 
same place .1 
 
 
NOTE 
 
 
1. Part of the misinterpretation by Brooks may be traceable to his misquotation in his second 
paragraph of our p. 196. By substituting the word 'the' for our word 'these', he may have 
lost sight of our basic concern (p. 196) with “. . . the decisions that are sacrificed 
because 'negative minorities' may be able to block efficient decisions.” 
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